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THE PROCESS/PRODUCT DISTINCTION AND THE
TUNA/DOLPHIN CONTROVERSY: GREENING THE
GATT THROUGH INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT
Alan Isaac Zreczny
I. INTRODUCTION
What is a product? When you pick up an item off the shelf at the local
grocery store, what are you selecting? Is the notion of a product limited to
the physical characteristics and qualities of the item itself as it sits on the shelf,
or does it extend to the method or process of its production? Assume that the
concept of a product encompasses both of these attributes. Can the
importation of these items be prohibited on the basis that the manner in
which they are produced contravenes the importing country's environmental
standards although the item itself, as imported, does not?
On September 3, 1991, a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT") dispute settlement panel ("the Panel") addressed this issue in what
may be considered one of the most controversial decisions in the history of the
GATT: United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna ("Tuna/Dolphin
Report").2  The Panel's message was clear: process based regulations are
incompatible with the GATT as it exists today.
II. THE PROCESS/PRODUCT DISTINCTIoN AND
• THE CLASH BETWEEN THE ENVIRONMENT AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
The most important issue facing the Panel was the GATT compatibility
of trade measures that blur the conventional boundaries of product definition.
Although the decision did not focus entirely on the quagmire that
characterizes the process/product distinction, the panel's findings on this issue
had a clear and determinative effect on the rest of its report.
From the point of view of environmental sustainability, process regulation
is considered as important as regulation of the product itself. Maintaining the
environmental services of our planet is essential to its robustness and hence to
sustainable development. Without the ability to ban products produced by
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1948) [hereinafter GATT].
2. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Dispute
Settlement Report, GATT Doc. No. DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991)
[hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin Report].
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environmentally unsustainable practices, countries will be lacking an essential
measure for achieving environmentally sustainable development, since the
measure is precisely tailored to deterring the unwanted practice. This does not
mean that all such bans should afortiori be acceptable, but rather they are the
starting point for judging such measures as necessary to achieve
environmentally sustainable development?
Environmental economists echo this view when justifying the regulation
of production, manufacturing, or fishing processes.
[F]rom the point of view of the importing country, it should be
irrelevant whether environmental losses arise during production or
consumption; both impose some costs on importing countries. This
may be most obvious when the loss incurred during production is
suffered directly by the importer... But the importer may also suffer
when an exporter chops down its rain forest or wipes out its rhinos.4
Therefore, when defining the relevant product, a wide framework of reference
must be adopted. This is especially true when only the process, and not the
traditional notion of the product itself, has detrimental environmental
implications. Without this broad definitional scope, entire categories of
environmentally damaging activities will continue to take refuge behind the
current letter of the international trading system.
Environmentalists view the Panel's decision as a threat to important
environmental laws. They fear promotion of freer trade at the expense of the
environment, and a situation where the rich and developed countries become
more and more reluctant to impose high environmental standards.' Trade
lawyers, on the other hand, perceive the Panel's findings as the natural result
when free trade, and the GATT system, collides with protectionist trade
measures of any sort.' Generally speaking, these "free-traders" find no
inherent contradiction when considering environmental protection and the
GATT. They remind environmentalists that the GATT serves to protect
3. Edith B. Weiss, Environment and Trade as Partners in Sustainable Devdopment: A
Commentary, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 728, 730 (1992).
4. GATTery v Greenery; The Perils of Eco-Sanctions, ECONOMIST, §Survey; The Environment,
May 30, 1992, at 14.
5. The Greening of Protectionism, ECONOMIST, STrade and the Environment, Feb. 27, 1993, at
26.
6. Robert F. Housman and Darwood J. Zaelke, The Collision of the Environment and Trade! The
GA7T Tuna/Dolphin Decision, XXII ENVTL L. REP. (ENVrL. L. INST.) 10268 (April, 1992).
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member states from market access restrictions imposed by an importing
country through the unilateral imposition of its domestic standards. In fact,
this position is said to embrace the concerns of environmentalists. The
suggestion is that chaos and anarchy, not increased environmental protection,
would result if the GATT permitted unilateral imposition of domestic
environmental standards.
7
Scrutiny of the Tuna/Dolphin Report reveals that the Panel was on
a mission to oppose the inclusion of the environment, and more specifically
the process/product distinction, into the current GATT framework. Although
in this particular instance this approach worked to the detriment of the
environment, it does not represent a frivolous case of discrimination. The
Panel recognized that incorporation of a new perspective to the
process/product distinction through the existing language of the GATT or
through interpretation of that language could result in forays of truly
questionable reasoning and therefore in great controversy. Rather than risk
the consequences of either of these undesirable alternatives, the Panel chose to
strictly apply the GATT and found process based regulations GATT illegal.
In so doing, the Panel served to further the argument that process based
regulations are necessary for environmental sustainability. By leaving no way
in which the current GATT system can be used or manipulated to permit such
regulations, the Panel urged and challenged the Contracting Parties to resolve
these issues on a multilateral basis.
I. THE PROCESS / PRODUCT DISTINCTION AND
THE TUNA / DOLPHIN DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PANEL REPORT
At the outset, it should be noted that the Panel's report has not yet
been adopted by the Contracting Parties to the GATT. Although such a
ruling does not represent a decision of the Contracting Parties, and thus has
no binding effect, it can still be quite influential. This is true if the decision
is well reasoned by panelists with outstanding reputations and where its
implications have been accepted by most or all of the Contracting Parties. In
this way, such a decision could become part of GATT jurisprudence and
practice.9 The international community's unanimous support of the Panel's
7. Thomas J. Schoenbaum, AGORA: TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT; Free International Trade
and Protection of the Environment: Irreconcilable Conflict?, 86 AM. J. INT'L. L. 700, 703 (1992).
8. Housman and Zaelke, supra note 6, at 10277.
9. JOHN H. JACKSON, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Council of Foreign Relations
Press, RESTucrURING THE GATT SYSTEM 68 (1989).
1994]
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ruling'° appears to place the Tuna/Dolphin Report in this category of
decisions. In addition, it seems logical that this sort of international consensus
would persuade a country to refrain from engaging in activity that is
perceived, though not officially recognized, as illegal under the GATT.
A. The Source of the Controversy: Dolphins in the Eastern Tropical Pacific and
the Process Based Regime of the Marine Mammal Protection Act
The Tuna/Dolphin controversy can be traced directly to a unique and
unexplained relationship that exists between dolphins and yellowfin tuna in
the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean ("ETP")." In the ETP, dolphin herds can
be found swimming directly over schools of yellowfin tuna.12  The
purse-seine fishing technique depends on this relationship for success. After
herding dolphins together, tuna boats encircle the dolphins with nets that are
then drawn together at the bottom. It is in this way that the yellowfin tuna
is caught. The nets, however, do not discriminate and also capture dolphins.
The dolphins often drown, are crushed in the hauling process, or are badly
wounded.13
In response, the United States ("U.S.") passed the Marine Mammal
Protection Act ("MMPA"). 14 The MMPA is a pure process oriented
regulation. The MMPA imposes a general moratorium on the taking and
importation of marine mammals and marine mammal products."5 This ban,
however, is subject to limited exceptions that require the issuance of
10. Nancy Bryson and Susan Koehn, Fishing in Treacherous Waters; GA7T Dispute over U.S.
Regulation of Tuna Harvesting Reveals Deeper Problems Between Environmental Protection and
International Trade Rule, RECORDER, SCommentary; International Environment, Jan. 23, 1992,
at S.
11. The ETP is defined as the area of the Pacific Ocean bounded by 40 degrees north latitude,
40 degrees south latitude, 160 degrees west longitude, and the western coastlines of North, Central,
and South America. 16 U.S.C. §1385(c)(2) (Supp. 11I 1991).
12. Christensen, GA TT Sets its Nets on Environmental Regulation: The GA TT Panel Ruling on
Mexican Ydlowfin Tuna Imports and the Need for Reform of the International Trading System, 23
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 569, 571 (1991-1992).
13. Kerry L. Holland, Exploitation on Porpoise" The Use of Purse Seine Nets by Commercial Tuna
Fishermen in the Eastern Tropical Pacfic Ocean, 17 SYRACUSE J. INT'L. L. & COMM. 267, 268-269
(1991)
14. 16 U.S.C. S 1361 (1988 & Supp. Hm 1991).
15. Id. at §1371(a).
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permits.16 One such exception allows for marine mammal takings incidental
to commercial fishing operations.17  Despite this exception, the MMPA
provides that:
[i]n any event it shall be the immediate goal that the
incidental kill or incidental serious injury of marine
mammals permitted in the course of commercial fishing
operations be reduced to insignificant levels approaching a
zero mortality and serious injury rate."8
More significantly, the MMPA indicates that this goal is particularly
critical with respect to yellowfin tuna harvested using purse-seine nets.
[T]his goal shall be satisfied in the case of the incidental
taking of marine mammals in the course of purse seine
fishing for yellowfin tuna by a continuation of the
application of the best marine mammal safety techniques and
equipment that are economically and technologically
practicable. 9
Finally, the MMPA requires the Secretary of the Treasury to impose a ban on
an importing country's commercial fish or fish products caught through the
use of commercial fishing technology that results in the incidental kill or
incidental serious injury of marine mammals in excess of U.S. standards."
This embargo can be removed only when the Secretary of Commerce certifies
that the incidental dolphin kill rate of the nation in question is comparable to
that of the U.S.
21
Fearing the GATT incompatibility of the MMPA's process based
trade sanctions, the U.S. had been reluctant to impose the ban on tuna imports
required under its terms.' In 1991, however, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a
16. Id. at §1374.
17. Id. at §1371(a)(2).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at §1371(a)(2) and §137(a)(2)(A)-(E) et seq.
21. Id. at 51371(a)(2)(B)(0-(ii).
22. The Greening ofProtectionism, supra note 5, at 25.
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Federal District Court injunction prohibiting the importation of yellowfin
tuna from Mexico, 23 and therefore forced the U.S. to impose the embargo.
As a result, Mexico requested consultations with the U.S. in November of
1990, and then requested that the Contracting Parties establish a dispute
resolution panel in January of 1991.24
B. The GA 7T and the Process/Product Distinction
The Panel analyzed the MMPA and the process/product distinction
under the framework of Article II and Article XI of the GATT. With this
in mind, and before analyzing the Panel report itself, it is important to
examine the relevant portions of these Articles.
Article I establishes the concept of national treatment and reads, in
part:
1. The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and
other internal charges, and laws, regulations and requirements
affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase,
transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal
quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or
use of products in specified amounts or proportions, should
not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to
afford protection to domestic production.
4. The products of the territory of any contracting party
imported into the territory of any other contracting party
shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all
laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution
or use.
25
23. Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991); See also Earth Island
Institute v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964 (N.D. Cal. 1990). The district court enjoined the
importation of yellowfin tuna from Mexico stating that the Secretary of Commerce had not made
a positive finding, as required by the MMPA and that Mexico had complied with the standards
regarding incidental takings of dolphin.
24. Tuna/Dolphin Report, supra note 2, 30 I.L.M. at 1549, 1.1.
25. GATT, supra note 1, Art. III, 1 and 4, 62 Stat. at 3680-3681, 62 U.N.T.S. at 82.
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The Note Ad Article III provides:
Any internal tax or other internal charge, or any law,
regulation or requirement of the kind referred to in
paragraph 1 which applies to an imported product and to the
like domestic product and is collected or enforced in the case
of the imported product at the time or point of importation,
is nevertheless to be regarded as an internal tax or other
internal charge, or a law, regulation or requirement of the
kind referred to in paragraph 1 and is accordingly subject to
the provisions of Article r1. 26
Article XI addresses the general elimination of quantitative restrictions.
According to Article XI:1:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or
other charges whether made effective through quotas, import
or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or
maintained by any contracting party on the importation of
any product of the territory of any other contracting party
or on the exportation or sale for export of any product
destined for the territory of any other contracting party.
1. What is the Product at Issue?
Definition of the relevant product represents a critical step in the Panel's
analysis. Mexico structured its argument to reflect a clear separation between
process and product. The U.S., on the other hand, advanced an ambiguous or
broad definition of the relevant product. The importance of product
definition is not limited to issues of international trade. Definition of the
relevant product represents part of the "loadstar" of U.S. antitrust analysis
2
under the Sherman Act.29 There, product determination is often onerous,
26. Id. Note Ad Art. Ill, Annex I, 62 Stat. at 3689, 62 U.N.T.S. at 104.
27. Id. Art. XI, para. 1, 61 Stat. at A32-33, 55 U.N.T.S. at 224, 226.
28. R.T.C v. R.R. Donnelly & Sons Co., Meridith Corp., & Pan Association L.P., 1990-1992 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 69, 239 (D.D.C 1990).
29. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1 and §2 (1988 & Supp. I1 1991).
1994]
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expensive, outcome determinative, and the subject of great debate and
controversy.
30
Mexico emphasized that the U.S. embargo on yellowfin tuna and
yellowfin tuna products was based on a non-existent category of products - "a
hybrid 'tuna/dolphin' category existing neither in the natural world nor in
tariff nomenclature: tuna associating with dolphins."31 Several countries, in
their submissions to the Panel, echoed this position of clear separation between
process and product. Australia noted that "the method of production or
processing of the tuna or tuna products did not alter the composition of the
product nor its end use."32 Canada distanced the fishing process and the
yellowfin tuna product even further. Canada indicated that the U.S. did not
maintain production limits on yellowfin tuna itself, but instead set limits on
dolphin mortality rates incidental to tuna catch.33 The arguments presented
by Venezuela also shared this line of reasoning.
34
The U.S. advanced a more ambiguous and less stringent definition of
product. According to the U.S., regulation of yellowfin tuna production
necessarily affects the yellowfin tuna product that results. The U.S. added that
there is not always a bright line distinction between regulations that affect the
sale and purchase of a particular product and those affecting its production.
35
2. Regulation of the Process.
With its definition of the relevant product in place, Mexico argued
that the MMPA, its corresponding regulations, and the U.S. prohibition on
imports of yellowfin tuna and yellowfin tuna products from Mexico were
contrary to Article XI. In addition, Mexico maintained that the exceptions
found under Article XI:2 did not apply. 6
30. See United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (where
the product distinction was made between the virgin and secondary (recycled) ingot market);
United States v. E.I. du Pont DeNemours & Co. (Cellophane), 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (where the
critical distinction was made between different types of flexible wrapping materials).
31. Tuna/Dolphin Report, supra note 2, 30 I.L.M. at 1602, 3.16.
32. Id. at 1610, 4.2.
33. Id. at 1611, 4.7.
34. See Id. at 1614, 4.27.
35. Id. at 1603, 3.18.
36. Id. at 1602, 3.10.
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The U.S. maintained that Article XI was not implicated in this
dispute. Rather, the U.S. asserted that the measures at issue were internal
regulations enforced at the time or point of importation and were therefore
subject to Article ]I through the Note Ad Article I. Furthermore, the U.S.
claimed that the MMvIPA complied with the national treatment requirement of
Article I as a law, regulation, and requirement affecting the internal sale,
offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of yellowfin tuna
harvested in the ETP with purse-seine nets.1
7
By simply prohibiting the import of non-conforming tuna products,
the U.S. argued that it could regulate production methods consistently with
Article II as long as such measures: (1) were not applied in a way to afford
protection to domestic production, and (2) satisfied the requirement of national
treatment." The U.S. added that the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade, which further refined the obligations of the parties, did not distinguish
between the regulation of products themselves and the regulation of the
processing methods used in their production.
39
With respect to the U.S. argument under Article II, Mexico reiterated
the justifications for keeping a well articulated process/product distinction in
the GATT.40 Mexico indicated that a product regulating measure could not
be characterized as consistent with Article E if it discriminated between
domestic and imported products based solely on the method of production.
41
Finally, Mexico espoused an "even if" argument. Assuming that process
regulation was lawful under the GATT, Mexico maintained that the MMPA
violated Article U1L4 due to the discrepancy that results when calculating the
number of "permissible takings" for foreign fleets compared to that for the
37. Id. at 1602, 3.11.
38. Id. at 1603, 3.19.
39. Id. at 1603, 3.21.
40. See supra "THE PROCESS / PRODUCT DISTINCTION AND THE CLASH BETWEEN
THE ENVIRONMENT AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE", at 1.
41. Tuna/Dolphin Report, supra note 2, 30 I.L.M. at 1602, 3.16.
19941
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U.S. fleet. 4' As was the case with the definition of the relevant product,
international consensus prevailed on the process regulation issue as well.43
3. Panel Resolution of the Process / Product Distinction.
The Panel acknowledged the U.S. position that while Article XI:1
prohibits quantitative restrictions on importation, Article m:4 and the Note
Ad Article I permit the imposition of internal regulations on products
imported from other Contracting Parties. This is true provided that the
internal regulation: (1) does not discriminate in violation of the
most-favored-nation principle of Article 1:1, (2) is not applied so as to protect
domestic production in violation of the national treatment principle of Article
111:1, and (3) accords to imported products treatment no less favorable than
granted to like products of national origin as required by Article ITI:4."4
The Panel, however, avoided any attempt to analyze the U.S.
definition of the relevant product. Clearly, the Panel was not interested in
undertaking an analysis that would somehow blur the line between the
traditional boundaries of process and product. Adhering to a strict textual
reading of Article Ill, the Panel accepted the Mexican definition of product.
The text of Article 111:1 refers to the application to imported
or domestic products of "laws, regulations and requirements
affecting the internal sale . ..of products" and "internal
quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or
42. According to Mexico: Such inconsistencies included, inter alia, the following: the United
States fleet had a general permit for incidental takings (an absolute quantity of 20,5000 dolphins
per year as a minimum ceiling, since there could be additional permits), while foreign fleets had
a specific limit with which to comply (average rate of incidental takings of marine mammals per
set, or ARITMM). The general permit of the United States fleet was arbitrarily fitted to that
fleet's needs, fixed and known in advance, while the criteria used for foreign fleets (ARITMM)
varied from year to year, depended on the performance of the United States fleet and were not
known in advance but until after the season hadclosed. The number of United States vessels still
fishing in the ETP was so small (only four because they had shifted to other areas before the new
provisions of the MMPA were introduced) that this fact alone had artificially lowered the figure
for ARITMM; if United States vessels no longer fished in the ETP, the United States ARITMM
would be zero. Two different formulas, one for the United States fleet and another for foreign
fleets, were used to compare United States ARITMM against a particular foreign fleet's ARITMM.
Finally, the formulas themselves were numerically biased in favour of the United States fleet to
the detriment of Mexico.
Id. at 1603, 3.22.
43. See id. at 1610-1616, 4.0-4.30.
44. Id. at 1617, 5.9.
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use of products"; it sets forth the 'principle' that such
regulations on products not be applied so as to afford
protection to domestic production. Article fI:4 refers solely
to laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal
sale, etc. of products. This suggests that Article EI covers
only measures affecting products as such.4"
To justify its narrow product definition, the Panel compared the imposition
of internal regulations under Article m:4 to the imposition of internal taxes
under Article 11:2.46 The Panel reasoned that prior Contracting Party
interpretations of national treatment made with respect to Article m11:2 could
be applied to Article 11I:4.17 Although the Panel stated that it was deferring
to the interpretation of the Contracting Parties with respect to aspects of
national treatment, it is evident that this analogy was made for purposes of
product definition.
The Panel looked to a Working Party report dealing with border tax
adjustments.48 This report states that:
there was a convergence of views [among the Contracting
Parties] to the effect that taxes directly levied on products
were eligible for tax adjustment. . . . Furthermore, the
Working Party concluded that there was convergence of
views to the effect that certain taxes that were not directly
levied on products were not eligible for tax adjustment.
45. Id. at 1617, 5.11.
46. Article M11:2 reads:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of
any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes
or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly,
to like domestic products. Moreover, no contracting party shall otherwise apply
internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or domestic products in a manner
contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1.
GATT, supra note 1, art. Il, 2, 62 Stat. at 3681, 62 U.N.T.S. at 82.
47. Tuna/Dolphin Report, supra note 2, 30 1.L.M. at 1618, 5.13.
48. Working Party Report on Border Tax Adjustments, 113464, adopted by the Contracting Parties
on December 2, 1970, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents (hereinafter BISD) 18S/97 (1972).
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Examples of such taxes comprised social security charges
whether on employers or employees and payroll taxes.49
This tax analogy underscores the difference between what the Panel
viewed as a process, and what it perceived as a product. The Working Party
distinguished between taxes paid on the product itself and those paid on what
can be described as "peripheral matters" such as social security charges and
payroll taxes. In similar fashion, the Panel could justify a distinction between
the yellowfin tuna products affected by the import ban and the peripheral or
unrelated matter of techniques used in yellowfin tuna fishing. Therefore, the
Panel's reasoning served to distance the relationship between the process
through which the yellowfin tuna was harvested and the imported tuna
product itself.
This analogy permitted the Panel to reaffirm its determination made
with respect to Article Im in general, and apply it to the Note Ad Article II.
[T]he Note Ad Article E covers only those measures that
are applied to the product as such. The Panel noted that the
MMPA regulates the domestic harvesting of yellowfin tuna
to reduce the incidental taking of dolphin, but that these
regulations could not be regarded as being applied to tuna
products as such because they would not directly regulate
that sale of tuna and could not possibly affect tuna as a
product. Therefore, the Panel found that the import
prohibition on certain yellowfin tuna and certain yellowfin
tuna products of Mexico and the provisions of the MMPA
under which it is imposed did not constitute internal
regulations covered by the Note Ad Article 1I1. 50
The Panel seemed to limit its definition of product regulation to more
"traditional" regulatory concerns, such as product wholesomeness."1 This sort
of characteristic, as opposed to the interplay between dolphin takings and tuna
fishing, is more easily attributed to the traditional notion of a product. It
seems, therefore, that the Panel required a more solid nexus between the
regulations imposed by the MMPA and the prohibited tuna products
49. Id. at 100-101, 14.
50. Tuna/Dolphin Report, supra note 2, 30 I.L.M. at 1618, 1 5.14.
51. Trachtman, GATT Dispute Settlement Panek International trade - quantitative restrictions -
national treatment - environmental protection - application of GA 7T to U.S. restrictions on import
of tuna from Mexico and other countries, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 142, 147 (1992).
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themselves 2 before stating that the measures in question passed GATT
scrutiny. As suggested by Mexico, "justification of the MMPA's link between
measures on tuna and dolphins could be found nowhere in the [GATT]"."
This analysis reflects the Panel's reluctance to depart from traditional notions
of process/product definitions.
Bright line separation between process and product is not without
GATT precedence. In the case of Belgian Family Allowances, a Belgian law
placed a levy on foreign goods purchased by public bodies when the goods
originated in a country whose system of family allowances did not meet
Belgian requirements.m Noting that the Belgian legislation was irreconcilable
with the spirit of the GATT,"s the dispute resolution panel concluded that
the law "introduced a discrimination between countries having a given system
of family allowances and those which had a different system or no system at
all, and made the granting of the exemption dependent on certain
conditions." 6 This, like the tax analogy used by the Panel, seems to
represent the more controversial portion of the process/product spectrum. In
these cases, the associated peripheral matters (social security and payroll taxes,
and systems of family allowances) make it difficult to argue that the lines
separating process and product are somehow blurry.
The concern in the process/product debate is clearly these more
difficult cases where countries may "excuse import restrictions on account of
unilateral parochial or cultural views about production [which may include]
religious discriminations, laws regarding employment of women, rigid 'safety'
standards or minimum wage and vacation rules."17 The reluctance to rule on
process based trade measures is related to the fear of creating significant
52. Id.
53. Tuna/Dolphin Report, supra note 2, 30 LL.M. at 1594, 3.50.
54. Belgian Family Allowances (Allocations Familiales), G/32, adopted by the Contracting Parties
on November 7, 1952, BISD/I1S/59, 1 (1953).
55. Id. at 61, 8.
56. Id. at 60, 3.
57. Jackson, Dolphins and Hormones: GATT and the Legal Environment for International Trade
After the Uruguay Round, 14 U. Alm Lrr ROCK L.J. 429, 435 (1992). See also Jackson, World
Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1227,
1243 (1992).
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loopholes in the GATT." The loopholes that would be opened for so-called
"production externalities" are significant because:
GATT rules set no bounds on such exemptions once they
are allowed. Where would discrimination stop? Would
exemptions be allowed only when the importing country is
directly affected by the environmental polices of the
exporter? . . . Should they be allowed when the
environmental harm occurs on no mans land: in the deep
oceans or in the atmosphere? 9
The legal argument used to substantiate this fear was well articulated by
Venezuela.
The United States measures were not internal laws subject to
Article Il (through the Note Ad Article M) because Article
IH did not cover a law which bans the importation of a
product not on the characteristics of the product but rather
on the method by which the product is produced. To
determine that a country could ban the sale of both domestic
and imported goods because the production of these goods
causes harm, on the theory that the ban is
non-discriminatory, would create a vast loophole in the
GATT. Potentially, any nation could thereby justify
unilaterally imposing its own social, economic or
employment standards as a criterion for accepting imports.
Any influential contracting party could effectively regulate
the internal environment of others simply by erecting trade
barriers based on unilateral environmental policies. This was
contrary to the fundamental premises of the GATT. 60
Although the Panel had clarified its definition of product and its
position on process regulation, it had not completed its analysis. As if to
make its point perfectly clear, the Panel went on to note that even if this
58. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Polices: Congruence or Conflict?, supra note
57, at 1240.
59. Gattery v Greenery; The Perils of Eco-Sanctions, supra note 4, at 14.
60. Tuna/Dolphin Report, supra note 2, 30 I.L.M. at 1614, 4.27.
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particular case could be characterized as a regulation of the sale of tuna as a
product, the national treatment requirement of Article I was not satisfied.
6 1
The Panel indicated that Article I1:4 requires a comparison of the
treatment received by imported tuna as a product with that of domestic tuna
as a product.62
A previous panel had found that Article 111:2, first sentence,
"obliges contracting parties to establish certain competitive
conditions for imported products in relation to domestic
products." Another panel had found that the words
"treatment no less favourable" in Article m11:4 call for
effective equality of opportunities for imported products in
respect of the application of laws, regulations or requirements
affecting the sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation,
distribution or use of products, and that this standard has to
be understood as applicable to each individual case of
imported products. It was apparent to the Panel that the
comparison implied was necessarily one between the
measures applied to imported products and the measures
applied to like domestic products.63
Given its previously established definition of the relevant product, the
Panel's analysis of national treatment is not surprising. The Panel once again
emphasized that a regulation governing the taking of dolphin incidental to
tuna harvesting could not affect tuna as a product. The Panel simply deferred
to language of Article I:4 and required that Mexican tuna receive treatment
no less favorable than that afforded to U.S. tuna. The Panel made clear that
this was the rule whether or not the level of incidental dolphin takings by
Mexican vessels corresponded to that of U.S. vessels.6 This finding alleviated
the need for the panel to look into MMPA's method for calculating Mexican
compliance with these standards, 6 since the principle of national treatment
was already found to have been contravened.6
6
61. Id. at 1618, 5.14.
62. Id. at 1618, 5.15.
63. Id. at 1617-1618, 5.12.
64. Id. at 1618, 5.15.
65. See supra, note 42.
66. Tuna/Dolphin Report, supra note 2, 30 I.L.M. at 1618 5.16.
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The Panel's removal of Article III as a justification for process based
regulations left the Mexican argument that the import prohibition on
yellowfin tuna and yellowfin tuna products from Mexico was simply a form
of quantitative restrictions in violation of Article XI. The U.S. presented no
argument in support of a contrary conclusion with respect to Article XI. As
a result, the Panel found the direct import prohibition on certain yellowfin
tuna and certain yellowfin tuna products from Mexico and the provisions of
the MMPA under which it is imposed inconsistent with Article XI:1.
67
The Panel's failure to recognize the legitimacy of process based trade
measures has been characterized as:
a head-in-the-sand attitude that runs counter to the political
reality that, worldwide, countries are moving to adopt
process standards, with related trade measures, that affect
both natural resources as well as manufactured goods.
Environmentalists are increasingly concerned about the life
cycle of a product, beginning with the extraction of natural
resources in the production process, but also including a
consideration of the environmental ramifications of




The Panel's resolution of the process/product distinction, however,
is consistent with its underlying "mission" not to engage in analysis that may
open the door for process regulation under the current GATT system. The
Panel achieved this goal by refusing to acknowledge the U.S. definition of
product on one hand and by adhering to a narrow interpretation of the
GATT on the other. It seems that regardless of the justification for process
regulation, environmental or otherwise, the Panel would have reached the
same conclusion. This suggests that a more open or interpretively forgiving
consideration of the process/product distinction is not an endeavor considered
appropriate for a GATT dispute resolution panel.
4. The Irony Inherent in the Panel's Process / Product Distinction.
At this point it is interesting to examine the Panel's analysis of the
labeling provisions of the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act
68. Hudson, Trade, Environment and the Pursuit of Sustainable Development, INJTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND THEENviRONMENTE WORLD BANKDIscussroN PAPERS 55,60 (Patrick Low, ed., 1992).
67. Id. at 1618, 11 5.18-5.19.
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("DPCIA").6" The DPCIA provides labeling standards for tuna products
exported from, or offered for sale in the U.S. This labeling regime focuses
specifically on yellowfin tuna harvesting operations in the ETP.70 In part,
the DPCIA makes punishable the use of the term "Dolphin Safe", or its
equivalent, on tuna products linked to purse-seine harvesting vessels in the
ETP that do not meet the requisite "dolphin safe" standards.7
In this part of its analysis, the Panel seems to contradict its product
definition and therefore the basis for its process/product distinction. Initially,
the Panel dismissed Mexico's argument that the labeling provisions were
governed by Article IX:l.n The Panel then addressed Mexico's concern that
the labeling provisions discriminated against Mexico as a country fishing in the
ETP and were therefore inconsistent with the most-favored-nation obligations
of Article I:1.73 The Panel found the labeling regime of the DPCIA
consistent with Article I:1 since it applied to all tuna caught in the ETP
regardless of the country of origin.74 In arriving at this conclusion the Panel
noted that:
69. 16 U.S.C. §1385 (1994).
70. Id. at 91385(b)(1).
71. Id. at §1385(d)(1)(B) and 51385(d)(2).
72. Article IX:1 reads, in part: "Each contracting party shall accord to the products of the
territories of other contracting parties treatment with regard to marking requirements no less
favourable than the treatment accorded to like products of any third country." GATT, supra note
1, art. IX, 1, 61 Stat. at A29, 55 U.N.T.S. at 220. The Panel indicated that Article IX is entitled
"Marks of Origin" and that its text refers to marks of origin of imported products. In addition,
the Panel observed that Article IX contained a most-favoured-nation requirement, but not one of
national-treatment. This, the Panel reasoned, indicated that Article IX was intended to regulate
marking of origin of imported products, but not marking of products generally. Tuna/Dolphin
Report, supra note 2, 30 I.L.M. at 1622 5.41.
73. Id. at 1622, 5.42. Article :1 reads:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection
with importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments
for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and
charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation
and exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of
Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting
party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the
territories of all other contracting parties.
GATT, supra note 1, art. I, 1, 61 Stat. at A12, 55 U.N.T.S. at 196, 198.
74. TunaDolphin Report, supra note 2, 30 I.L.M. at 1622 5.43-5.44.
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the labeling provisions of the DPCIA do not restrict the sale
of tuna products; tuna products can be sold freely both with
and without the "Dolphin Safe" label. Nor do these
provisions establish requirements that have to be met in
order to obtain an advantage from the government. Any
advantage which might possibly result from access to this
label depends on the free choice by consumers to give
preference to tuna carrying the "Dolphin Safe" label. The
labelling provisions therefore did not make the right to sell
tuna or tuna products, nor the access to a
government-conferred advantage affecting the sale of tuna or
tuna products, conditional upon the use of tuna harvesting
methods.7s
This statement serves to undermine the Panel's analysis undertaken
with respect to categorization of the MMPA measures under Article II or
Article XI, and therefore with respect to the definition of the relevant product.
Here the panel noted that the consumer has a choice to purchase a can of
tuna, what the Panel defined as the relevant product, that is labeled "Dolphin
Safe". In so doing, the Panel compressed the process and the product into
inseparable components. The Panel's statement indicates, much in line with
the U.S. definition of product, that a can of tuna labeled "Dolphin Safe"
corresponds to a product. Clearly, the only way to assure that this product
is in fact "Dolphin Safe" is to examine its method of production or regulate
its manufacturing process.
This same sort of contradictory reasoning is present in the GATT
Secretariat's paper dealing with the issue of trade and the environment. 76 The
GATT Secretariat, although with no authority to interpret GATT law or
determine GATT polices,77 strongly opposes process based trade regulations.
"In principle, it is not possible under GATT's rules to make access to one's
own market dependent on the domestic environmental policies or practices of
the exporting country."7  However, when dealing with the issue of
alternatives to unilateral and extrajurisdictional application of domestic
environmental laws, the GATT Secretariat proposes "consumer-based actions,
75. Id. at 1622, 5.42.
76. GATT Secretariat, Trade and the Environment, Advanced Copy (Geneva, Feb. 12, 1992).
77. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Trade and Environment: Conflicts and
Opportunities, at 7, OTA-BP-ITE-94 (Washington, DC; U.S. Government Printing Office, May
1992) [hereinafter OTA Report].
78. GATT Secretariat, supra note 76, at 10.
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including the promotion of environmental labelling so that consumers can
easily concentrate their purchases on products produced in what they consider
to be environmentally-safe ways.""9 These inconsistencies may simply be the
result of the Panel and the Secretariat trying to stave off the contemporary
reality of environmental sustainability with the existing language of the
GATT.
Despite these apparent incongruities, the Panel's position on the issue
of process regulation has been vindicated. The Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations"' ("the
Final Act"), does not indicate a tolerance for production or process based
regulations. Under the new Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade ("the
Standards Code") it is no longer enough that regulations on imports be no
more stringent than regulations on domestic products. The Final Act, which
expands the Standards Code to cover processes and production methods, adds
that even if import and domestic regulations are identical, the import
regulation may be challenged for not being the least trade restrictive device to
meet the underlying environmental objective." Therefore, it is easy to
envision losing a dispute on the issue of whether process based regulations are
more trade restrictive than alternative approaches, whatever those may be.
C. The Effect of the Process /Product Distinction
on the Rest of the Panel Report.
With its resolution of the process/product distinction secured, the
Panel turned to the U.S. argument under Article XX. Article XX reads, in
part:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied
in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be
79. Id. at 25.
80. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Office of the United States Trade Representative, Office of the President, December, 15, 1993
[hereinafter Final Act].
81. Id. at Part I, Annex 1-A Agreements on Trade in Goods, §6 Agreement on Technical Barriers
to Trade, Technical Regulations and Standards, art. 2.2. See also, Charnovitz, Special Report: Trade
Negotiations and the Environment, BNA INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT DAILY (BNA) (March
27, 1992).
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construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
contracting party of measures:
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption. 2
The U.S. proposed that even if otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of
the GATT, the embargo imposed under the MMPA could be justified under
Article XX as an exception to GATT obligations.83
It is not surprising to find that the Panel's definition of the relevant
product and subsequent stand on the process/product distinction set the
framework for its finding with respect to the U.S. arguments advanced under
Article XX. The Panel found that the U.S. direct import prohibition on
certain yellowfin tuna and certain yellowfin tuna products of Mexico,
imported directly from Mexico, and the provisions of the MMPA under which
it is imposed, could not be justified under either Article XX(b) or ArticleyX(g).84
1. Extraterritoriality
GATT jurisprudence indicates that Article XX has not been
interpreted to allow the imposition, by one government, of regulations to
protect the life or health of humans, animals, or plants outside its own
territory. 5 Despite this historically rooted fact, the U.S. argued that Article
XX(b) and XX(g) could be used in such a way as to extraterritorially enforce
the process based regulations of the MMPA.
a. Extraterritorial Application of Article XX(b)
The U.S. argued under Article XX(b) that the MMPA embargo was
necessary to protect the lives and health of dolphins. According to the U.S.,
82. GATT, supra note 1, art. XX (b) and (g), 61 Stat. at A60-61, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262.
83. Tuna/Dolphin Report, supra note 2, 30 I.L.M. at 1604, 3.27.
84. Id. at 1620 5.29, and at 1621, 5.34.




the requisite threshold of necessity required for successful implementation of
Article XX(b) was achieved since no alternative measure to the ban, that could
reasonably be expected to attain its objective, was either available or
proposed."6 This argument follows logically from the U.S. definition of
product that incorporates the fishing technique used to capture yellowfin tuna
in the ETP.
Purse-seining for tuna in the ETP meant deliberate
encirclement of schools of dolphin with nets. Without
efforts to protect them, they would be killed when the tuna
was harvested. In order to avoid these needless deaths, the
United States had established requirements for tuna
production: yellowfin tuna harvested in the ETP using
purse-seine nets and imported into the United States must
have been produced under a program providing for
harvesting methods to reduce dolphin mortality.
Furthermore, in the case of vessels other than those of the
United States, the resultant mortality had to be no greater
per set than 25 percent more than the average mortality per
set for United States vessels during the same period, and the
mortality of two stocks especially vulnerable to depletion
could not exceed specified percentages of overall mortality.
These measures were directly and explicitly to prevent
dolphin deaths or severe injury. Accordingly, it was clear
that the measures of the United States were necessary to
protect animal life or health.1
7
The Mexican argument against this sort of de facto extraterritorial application
of environmental laws seems to reflect the same concerns the Panel expressed
with respect to process regulation."
Mexico also asserted that nothing in Article XX entitled any
contracting party to impose measures in the implementation
of which the jurisdiction of one contracting party would be
subordinated to the legislation of another contracting party.
It could be deduced from the letter and spirit of Article XX
that it was confined to measures contracting parties could
adopt or apply within or from their own territory. To
86. Tuna/Dolphin Report, supra note 2, 30 I.L.M. at 1605, 3.33.
87. Id.
88. Jackson, supra note 9.
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accept that one contracting party might impose trade
restrictions to conserve the resources of another contracting
party would have the consequence of introducing the
concept of extraterritoriality into the GATT, which would
be extremely dangerous for all contracting parties. In this
context, Mexico recalled that, under the MMPA, the United
States not only arrogated to itself this right of interference,
but also the right of interference in trade between other
contracting parties, by providing for an embargo of countries
considered to be "intermediary nations" simply because they
continued to buy products which the United States had
unilaterally decided should not be imported by itself or by
any other country."9
The Panel stated that whether Article XX(b) reached measures necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health outside the jurisdiction of the
Contracting Party invoking a particular measure was not clearly answered by
the text of that provision itself. In order to solve this dilemma, the Panel
undertook an analysis of the drafting history of Article XX(b), its purposes,
and the consequences the interpretations suggested by both the U.S. and
Mexico would have on the operation of the GATT system as a whole."
The Panel's interpretive examination indicates that Article XX(b) is
derived from Article 32 of the Draft Charter of the International Trade
Organization ("ITO"). That article read, in part: "Nothing in Chapter IV of
this Charter shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
Member of measures: (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health". Exception (b) was amended in the New York Draft of the ITO
Charter to read: "For the purpose of protecting human, animal or plant life
or health, if corresponding domestic safeguards under similar conditions exist
in the importing country". The Panel reasoned that this addition was included
to address concerns regarding the abuse of sanitary regulations by importing
countries. This clause was then deemed unnecessary by Commission A of the
Second Session of the Preparatory Committee. Removal of this explanatory
language persuaded the Panel to believe that Article XX(b) only addresses the
use of sanitary measures to safeguard life or health of humans, animals or
plants within the jurisdiction of the importing country.
The Panel used this rationale to affirm the policy warnings expressed
89. Tuna/Dolphin Report, supra note 2, 30 I.L.M. at 1605, 3.31.
90. Id. at 1619, 5.25.
91. Id. at 1620, 5.26.
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by Mexico and to caution against an expansive and extraterritorial reading of
Article XX(b).
[I]f the broad interpretation of Article XX(b) suggested by
the United States were accepted, each contracting party could
unilaterally determine the life or health protection policies
from which other contracting parties could not deviate
without jeopardizing their rights under the General
Agreement. The General Agreement would then no longer
constitute a multilateral framework for trade among all
contracting parties but would provide legal security only in
respect of trade between a limited number of contracting
parties with identical internal regulations. 92
It follows that an extraterritorial reading of Article XX(b) would allow for
process regulation within a foreign country, thereby implicating issues of
national sovereignty. To avoid these complications, and to reaffirm its clear
distinction between the method of fishing and the tuna products in question,
the Panel had to outlaw extraterritorial application of the MMPA. This
provided the Panel with yet another, though indirect, approach to conclude
that process regulation is not consistent with a Contracting Party's obligations
under the GATT.
This rationale, however, seems vulnerable to attack. It is equally
plausible to suggest that it is the country engaging in the environmentally
unsustainable act that impinges on the sovereignty of others. In this case, for
example, the jurisdictionless dolphins belong to none and all of the world's
countries at the same time. Therefore, U.S. sovereignty can be considered
compromised regardless of where the dolphins are victimized.
b. Extraterritorial Application of Article XX(g)
The U.S. argued that Article XX(g was applicable to the present
dispute since the measures in question were made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on the domestic production or consumption of tuna.9"
92. Id. at 1619, 5.27.
93. The U.S. stated that it had imposed comprehensive restrictions on domestic production
practices expressly to conserve dolphin, which restrictions were more stringent than those applied
to production by foreign vessels. The United States had since the beginning of its regulation of
its tuna industry required certain gear and fishing procedures. Currently, it also prohibited sets
on dolphin after sundown, prohibited the use of explosives to herd schools of dolphin, regulated
the number of speedboats that could be used in purse-seining operations, required that each vessel
carry an observer, and enforced performance standards under which no United States vessel
operator could exceed a rate of dolphin mortality set in regulations. Violation of these regulations
1994]
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Furthermore, the U.S. contended that the geographic or territorial location of
the dolphin being conserved was not a limiting factor under Article XX(g). 4
Mexico reiterated its objection to the process based trade measures
imposed by the MMPA. Mexico noted that the embargo covered a product
that did not correspond to the product sought to be conserved." In other
words, the definition of the relevant product was being played out once again,
this time under the auspices of Article XX(g). Mexico claimed that the
embargo was applied to imports of yellowfin tuna and yellowfin tuna products
from Mexico whereas the U.S. Article XX(g) claim sought to justify the
measures of the MMPA on the grounds of dolphin conservation. 6
Consequently, the United States was not conserving one
resource (dolphins) or two resources (dolphins and tuna) but
rather a specific combination of products (tuna/dolphin)
located in a specific geographical area (the ETP), which did
not correspond to any known trade classification either
within or outside GATT. If restrictions of the tuna-dolphin
type were deemed to be justified under Article XX(g),
contracting parties could begin, for example, imposing
prohibitions on the import of paper in order to protect the
trees used to produce the paper, or on imports of
pharmaceuticals to protect the animals used as laboratory test
subjects for them.
9 7
Therefore, Mexico insisted that the U.S. was not applying the measures in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption."
could result in vessel and cargo seizure. The import prohibition at issue in the current dispute
was a natural outgrowth of the restrictions on the domestic production of yellowfin tuna in the
ETP. The United States measures were primarily aimed at rendering effective these restriction on
the United States fleet, as restricting the United States vessel practices would not ensure the
conservation of dolphin if other countries' vessels continued to cause dolphin mortality.
Id. at 1607, 3.41.
94. Id. at 1607, 3.42.
95. Id. at 1608, 3.47
96. Id. at 1608, 3.50.
97. Id. at 1608-1609, para 3.50. This view was shared by many of the countries that submitted
arguments to the Panel. The European Union [hereinafter EU] at 1613, 14.14; Japan at 1614,
4.19; and Norway at 1614, 4.21.
98. Id. at 1608, 3.51.
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As for restrictions on tuna/dolphin, no such product existed
either in nature or in any known tariff nomenclature, and
therefore its application within the general exceptions to the
General Agreement would exceed the principle that such
exceptions must be interpreted restrictively in order to avoid
abuses. Even if this hybrid could be considered under Article
XX, it would then be necessary to clarify, for instance, who
defines it, what its characteristics were, what its scientific
basis was, or what the relationship was between the two."
Finally, Mexico simply emphasized that Article XX(g) did not grant
extraterritorial jurisdiction over natural resources not located in the territory
of the contracting party invoking that provision."
The Panel was faced with several interesting questions with respect to
the extraterritorial application of Article XX(g). The Canadian submission
articulated these points well.
Could the term "restrictions" on domestic production extend
to restrictions on the production process? To what extent
did Article XX(g) require that the resource being conserved
be the same as the product subject to trade restrictions.
There also remained the question of when and to what
extent measures taken relating to unilaterally-set conservation
objectives [could] be extended to areas outside national
jurisdictions."10'
The Panel's reasoning, which by this time was no longer unexpected,
prohibited the regulation of the production process outside the territory of a
contracting party and required the product subject to trade restrictions to be
the same as that being conserved. The Panel stressed that the control of the
production or consumption of an exhaustible natural resource could be
effective only to the extent that the production or consumption of that
resource was under its own jurisdiction. 2  In a restatement of its
determination regarding Article XX(b), the Panel simply described the
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1608, 3.47.
101. Id. at 1612, 4.8.
102. Id. at 1620-1621, 5.31.
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problems associated with an extrajurisdictional interpretation of Article
yXg). 103
Finally, the Panel indicated that in order to meet the requirements of
Article XX(g) "a measure could only be considered to have been taken 'in
conjunction with' production restrictions if it was primarily aimed at
rendering effective these restrictions." '  The Panel, however, did not
consider whether the process based measures of the MMPA met this
requirement assuming extraterritorial application of Article XX(g) was
appropriate. The Panel's jurisdictional resolution implies that it did not find
this standard to have been achieved by the U.S.010
The Panel's analysis with respect to Articles Il and XI, and the
process/product boundaries established there, clearly affected its examination
of extraterritoriality under Article XX. The rule derived, that Article IM
applies only to product regulation and not to production processes, gave the
panel a framework with which to analyze the general exceptions to the GATT
under Article XX. The distinction between process and product has been
characterized as a conflict of laws rule designed with jurisdictional allocative
purposes in mind. The implication is that production processes are within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the domestic producer and exporter, whereas the
importer has the exclusive jurisdiction over products physically brought into
its territory.' 6  Thus, the Panel seemed to focus on principles of
territoriality. This principle, emanating from a State's sovereignty over its
national territory, permits a State to regulate conduct that occurs within its
own national borders. 07  According to the Panel, therefore, process
103. Id. at 1621, 5.32.
104. Id. (Citing CanadaMeasures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, L/6268,
adopted by the Contracting Parties on March 22, 1988, BISD 35S/98, 114, 4.6 (1989)).
105. Despite its statement to the contrary, the Panel did comment on this matter. Leaving no
stone unturned, the Panel indicated how it would have ruled had such an inquiry been
undertaken. The Panel recalled that the United States linked the maximum incidental
dolphin-taking rate which Mexico had to meet during a particular period in order to be able to
export tuna to the United States to the taking rate actually recorded for United States fisherman
during the same period. Consequently, the Mexican authorities could not know whether, at a
given point of time, their conservation policies conformed to the United States conservation
standards. The Panel considered that a limitation on trade based on such unpredictable conditions
could not be regarded as being primarily aimed at conservation of dolphins.
Id. at 1621, 5.33.
106. Trachtman, supra note 51, at 150.
107. BORN AND WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS:




regulation is linked directly to territorial jurisdiction. The Panel's clear
separation of process and product prevents process regulation without a
corresponding jurisdictional claim.
2. International Agreement
The Panel's position on the process/product distinction also
influenced its suggestion for resolution of the controversy. Interestingly, the
GATT does seem to permit a ban on imports that can be traced to a particular
type of production process. Article XX provides an exception for measures
"relating to the products of prison labour."08 Unlike purse-seine fishing,
however, there seems to be universal consensus against the use of prison labor.
In fact, one may even suggest that this has risen to the level of customary
international law. This sort of distinction appears to have influenced the
Panel's recommendation for international agreement as the form for ultimate
resolution of the process/product controversy.
The Panel was quite careful to emphasize the point that the GATT
is not per se hostile to the environment. The Panel noted that "Article XX(b)
allows each contracting party to set its human, animal or plant life or health
standards"109 and "that Article XX(g) allows each contracting party to adopt
its own conservation polices."1 However, as the Panel emphasized in its
concluding remarks, its analysis was strict constructionalist in nature and was
therefore limited to the confines of the existing GATT system. The Panel
wished to underline that its task was limited to the examination of this matter
"in the light of the relevant GATT provisions", and therefore did not call for
a finding on the appropriateness of the United States' and Mexico's
conservation policies as such."' This sort of statement, not unique to this
particular conciliation, 2 reflects the Panel's apparent uneasiness with forging
108. GATT, supra note 1, art. XX, (e), 61 Stat. at A61, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262.
109. Tuna/Dolpbin Report supra note 2, 30 LL.M. at 1619, 5.27.
110. Id. at 1621, 5.32.
111. Id. at 1622, 6.1.
112. Only two years earlier, a dispute resolution panel, resolving a question of intellectual
property protection, concluded in a similar manner. To avoid any misunderstanding as to the
scope and implications of the above findings, the Panel stresses that neither Article 1I1:4 nor
Article XX(d) puts obligations on contracting parties specifying the level of protection that they
should accord to patents or the effectiveness of procedures to enforce such protection. The only
task entrusted to the Panel was to see whether the treatment accorded to imported products under
Section 337 is compatible with the Rules of the General Agreement.
United States Section 337 of the TariffAct of 1930, 116439, adopted by the Contracting Parties on
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a new definitional analysis and therefore its reluctance to resolve the
process/product controversy on its own. With respect to Article XX(b),
Mexico questioned the "necessity" of the embargo instituted under the MMPA.
Mexico indicated that its own dolphin protection measures were in conformity
with the GATT "demonstrating that the General Agreement did not oblige its
contracting parties to adopt measures contrary to the environment""' In
fact, Mexico indicated that the only way to achieve process oriented
environmental protection, in this case dolphin conservation, was through
international agreement." 4
Indeed, dolphin protection should be carried out not just for
purse-seining in the ETP but in all waters of the world, all fishing methods,
all fisheries, and all dolphin species. The best way of protecting the lives and
health of dolphins was international cooperation among all concerned, not by
arbitrary, discriminatory and unilateral trade measures."'
Mexico's call for international agreement was echoed by many of the
countries that submitted arguments to the Panel.116 In essence, there already
November 7, 1989, BISD S36/345, 396, 6.1 (1990).
113. Tuna/Dolphin Report, supra note 2, 30 1.L.M. at 1606, 3.34.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. The EU stated that it "was ready to offer its full support to current efforts to reinforce
international cooperation on the problems raised by the incidental kill of migratory species." Id.
at 1612, 4.10; Korea "asked whether there existed any generally-recognized target level of
protection in international agreements or practices, on which basis individual countries were
authorized to act; if not, then it could only be assumed that certain countries' trade actions based
on environmental objectives could be GATT-inconsistent." Id. at 1614, 14.20; Thailand noted that
"[i]nstead of the embargo, which imposed United States domestic law extraterritorially,
international consultations on conservation would be a better way of solving the problem without
resorting to trade measures. Indeed, such consultations were mandated by the [MMPA] itself."
Id. at 1614, 1 4.24; Venezuela emphasized "its efforts to reduce incidental dolphin mortality in
tuna fishing, consistent with recommendations of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission
("IATTC"). Venezuela further noted the January 1991 IATTC recommendation that tuna
fishermen, to preserve tuna stocks, concentrate their fishing on adult tuna, which swim with
dolphin; the IATTC had recommended that tuna harvesters not attempt to avoid catching dolphin
completely but continue to fish adult tuna while using all possible measures to avoid the incidental
catch of dolphins. The Venezuelan tuna industry had complied with this international regime and
been embargoed by the United States (under the intermediary embargo provisions of the MMPA).
Venezuela urged the development of multilateral measures to protect dolphins, and urged that the
MMPA embargo be lifted." "Venezuela would be more sympathetic to an exception to Article XI
for agreed compliance measures taken under an international environmental treaty regime. Yet
until such an exception exists, the contracting parties could not allow the United States to avoid
its Article XI obligations by distorting the Article II notion of internal measures." Id. at 1614, 1
4.26-4.27.
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exists international consensus on the proper mechanism through which to
resolve the process/product controversy, at least with respect to dolphin
conservation. In what can only be described as an oversight or perhaps even
a mistake in argument, the U.S. acknowledged that "the need to conserve
dolphin was recognized internationally, as for example in the work of the
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission ("IATTC") and the United
Nations Convention on the law of the Sea."
117
The Panel agreed with the call for resolution through international
agreement. In so doing, it relied on a prior panel's narrowly construed
definition of "necessary."
[T]he import restrictions imposed by Thailand could be
considered to be "necessary" in terms of Article XX(b) only
if there were no alternative measure consistent with the
General Agreement, or less inconsistent with it, which
Thailand could reasonably be expected to employ to achieve
its health policy objectives."'
This indicates that only the least trade restrictive measures will justify use of
Article XX(b) and therefore imposition of environmentally based trade
sanctions. With this is mind, the Panel indicated that even assuming that
extrajurisdictional protection of life and health were an acceptable
interpretation of Article XX(b), the requirement of necessity was not achieved.
The Panel found that the U.S. had not exhausted all reasonably
available GATT consistent options through which to pursue its objectives.
The Panel specifically noted the possibility of negotiation of international
cooperative arrangements which it felt were "desirable in view of the fact that
dolphins roam the waters of many states and the high seas." 1 9 In fact, the
Panel's constant reference to the unilateral measures of the U.S. indicates that
process based trade measures taken pursuant to an international agreement
117. Id. at 1607, 3.40. The IATTC was formed in 1950 as the result of negotiations with
respect to fishing zones between the U.S. and Costa Rica in 1950. The IATTC was designed to
regulate fishing and protect marine resources. In the mid 1970's, the IATTC turned its attention
to the tuna/dolphin problem, and emphasized a need to reduce dolphin mortality. This program
was envisaged to have international scope and purpose. Exploitation on Porpoise: The Use of Purse
Seine Nets by Commercial Tuna Fishermen in the Eastern Tropical Paczfic Ocean, supra note 13, at
275-276.
118. Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, DS1OIR, adopted
by the Contracting Parties on November 7, 1990, BISD 37/200, 222-223, 75 (1990).
119. Tuna/Dolphin Report supra note 2, 30 I.L.M. at 1620 5.28.
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with broad multilateral support would somehow be considered more
acceptable120 and therefore deemed consistent with the GATT or permissible
under its general exceptions. Finally, the Panel pointed out that even
assuming that the trade measures of the MMPA represented the only means
of achieving U.S. objectives, the unpredictability of the permissible incidental
taking rate and the resulting inability of the Mexican authorities to know, at
any given time, if they were in conformity with U.S. regulations, removed any
possibility of meeting the requisite standard of necessity.'
Ironically, this line of reasoning suggests that a change in the method
of calculating of permissible incidental takings combined with the failure of
negotiations with Mexico would permit U.S. application of the process based
regulations of the MMPA in an extraterritorial fashion.'1 Furthermore, the
Panel's interpretation of "necessary", poses a problem: how diligently does
one country have to attempt negotiation of an agreement before making
unilateral trade measures "necessary"?'1 And therefore, when is the attempt
to fulfill this "necessity" requirement deemed exhausted?
Similar to the call to prohibit process based regulations, the Panel's
suggestion for international agreement as the way to resolve the
process/product controversy was also vindicated. According to the GATT
Secretariat:
[i]f the goal is to influence environmental policies and
practices in other counties, the option which is most
consistent with orderly international relations is
inter-governmental cooperation leading to a multilateral
agreement. By offering each country the opportunity to
explain and defend its view of the problem, the negotiating
process increases the chances of uncovering solutions
acceptable to all the affected parties. Cooperative efforts also
offer the best chance of ensuring that the policy changes deal
directly with the problem at hand and that they provide
minimum scope for protectionist abuses.12 4
120. OTA Report, supra note 77, at 49.
121. Tuna/Dolphin Report, supra note 2, 30 I.L.M. at 1620 1 5.28.
122. Donoghue, 7he Trade Provisions of International Environment Agreements: Can They Be
Reconciled With The GATT?, Proceedings, Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law at 236 (1992).
123. OTA Report, supra note 77, at 52.
124. GATT Secretariat, supra note 76, at 10.
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The GATT Secretariat has underscored the importance of keeping a bright line
distinction between process and product. In what appears to be a direct
commentary on the Tuna/Dolphin controversy, the Secretariat indicates that
"[n]egative incentives - in particular, the use of discriminatory trade restrictions
on products unrelated to the environmental issue at hand - are not an effective
way to promote multilateral cooperation." 1
In addition, the Final Act's standards relating to human, animal and
plant health oblige a country to base its own standards on international rules
where they exist. In the alternative, such standards are to be set so as not to
needlessly discriminate against other countries where similar conditions
prevail."' Finally, in its effort to design principles to guide the conduct of
people and nations towards one another and towards the environment, 127 the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development has directly
addressed the process/product controversy. Principle 12 of the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development ("Rio Declaration") reads, in
part:
Unilateral actions to deal with environmental challenges
outside the jurisdiction of the importing country should be
avoided. Environmental measures addressing transboundry
or global environmental problems should, as far as possible,
be based on an international consensus. 2 8
The Rio Declaration seems to have expressly adopted the Panel's ruling as
well.
The justifications used to support multilateral agreements that secure
international environmental objectives parallel those advanced for the trade
measures such agreements would impose. It has been suggested that such trade
measures only be used: (1) where the conduct at issue has global
environmental effects, (2) when trade measures are matched by domestic
regulations, (3) if they are truly multilateral with broad support, (4) where
there are positive efforts and incentives to encourage adherence by reluctant
125. Id. at 4.
126. Final Act, supra note 80, Annex 1-A, Agreements on Trade in Goods, §6 Agreement on
Tecbnical Barriers to Trade, Regulations and Standards, arts. 2.4 and 2.5. See also The Greening of
Protectionism, supra note 5, at 26.
127. McDorman, The 1991 U.S. -Mexico GA7TPanel Report On Tuna And Dolpbin Implication
For Trade And Environment Conflicts, 17 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 461, 478 (1992).
128. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, The Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Principle 12, A/CONF.151/5/Rev 1 (June 13,
1992).
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countries, (5) if they are related to the conduct at issue, and (6) if they are
crucial to achieving the environmental goal in question.
129
The culmination of the Panel's Article XX analysis indicates that in
the absence of a violation of international standards, this Article will provide
little protection for environmental regulations that apply to a foreign
producer's manufacturing processes. 30  The Panel's process/product
distinction appears to remove any possibility for process regulation under the
present GATT system. As a result, one must ask if a broad product definition
or a process based regulation in the name of the environment represents a
legitimate cause. And if so, how can the GATT system be altered to
accommodate this purpose?
IV. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE/GREEN THE GATT
The Panel's ruling crystallized the fact that there presently exists a
democratic deficiency where international trade and the environment are
concerned. This legislative failure has permitted the process/product
controversy to flourish.
In essence the panel here has stated that the fundamental impediment
to an overlay of environmental concerns and standards on trade policy is the
lack of a comprehensive set of GATT-approved, internationally accepted,
environmental norms. While GATT as a set of internationally negotiated,
accepted, and periodically amended rules governs trade activities, no similar
body of comprehensive international agreements exist with respect to
environmental concerns and standards."'
As it stands today, the GATT contemplates no mechanism for
simultaneous and equivalent consideration of substantive environmental
matters and issues concerning international trade.
3 2
It is no longer possible to ignore the inseparable relationship between
international trade and the environment. The controversies that arise as the
result of this interaction may be addressed in several ways. Some argue that
the GATT should not represent the forum in which international
environmental guidelines are negotiated. The argument, as demonstrated in
129. OTA Report, supra note 77, at 44-45.
130. Kass and Gerrard, International Trade, NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL, SEnvironmental Law,
at 29 (Jan. 24, 1992).
131. Manard, GATT and the Environment: The Friction Between International Trade and the
World's Environment - The Dolphin and Tuna Dispute, 5 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 373, 418 (1992).
132. Id. at 423.
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Australia's Tuna/Dolphin submission, is that neither a dispute resolution panel
nor the GATT in general has the "competence to rule on the actual danger to
health, morals or the environment represented by specific goods or their
method of production." 13  In fact, during a debate on trade and
environmental issues in May of 1991, just prior to the Panel's decision, the
GATT Council agreed that the GATT's proper role was to promote liberal
trade. The Council felt that the issues of setting or harmonizing
environmental policies and standards were best left to international
environmental agreements.1 4
Others view the basic GATT structure as effective and the basis on
which environmental concerns should be addressed. The European Parliament
recently questioned the GATT's competence on environmental matters, calling
for a two year moratorium on panel judgments dealing with the environment.
According to the European Parliament, this ban should continue until GATT
practice and the GATT Articles themselves are strengthened with respect to
environmental policy.
135
With these philosophical positions in mind, the question becomes
should the GATT be altered? Or, should another international regime,
separate from the GATT, emerge to address the process/product controversy
and environmental matters in general? The GATT's proven infrastructure
indicates that it is the natural and most logical basis on which to build an
international environmental regime. Ultimately, the goal should be to create
a General Agreement on Tariffs, Trade, and the Environment ('the GATTE"),
or its equivalent under the proposed World Trade Organization ("WTO").'3'
The Panel's decision appears to move towards this ultimate, though
unstated, goal. Throughout its ruling, the Panel was reluctant to distort the
traditional framework of the GATT. This allowed the Panel to dismiss the
U.S. definition of product with an "our hands are tied" argument. The Panel's
justification for a strict interpretation of current GATT provisions is fully
revealed in its Concluding Remarks.
133. Tuna/Dolphin Report, supra note 2, 30 I.L.M. at 1610, 4.1.
134. OTA Report, supra note 77, at 23; See also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GA 77
Activities 1991: An Annual Review of the Work of the GAT, 96, (Geneva, July 1992).
135. ECParliament Proposes Two-Year Moratorium on GATTPand Environmental Decisions, Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) §General Developments: GATT (Jan. 27, 1993). This proposal seems quite
ironic considering the EU complaint under the GATT with respect to the intermediary ban of
the MMPA. See infra note 163.
136. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Approved April 15, 1994. Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) at 636 (April 20, 1994).
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The Panel further recalled its finding that the import
restrictions examined in this dispute, imposed to respond to
differences in environmental regulation of producers could
not be justified under the exceptions in Articles XX(b) or
XX(g). These exceptions did not specify criteria limiting the
range of life or health protection polices, or resource
conservation policies for the sake of which they could be
invoked. It seemed evident to the Panel that, if the
Contracting Parties were to permit import restrictions in
response to differences in environmental policies under the
General Agreement, they would need to impose limits on the
range of policy differences justifying such responses and to
develop criteria so as to prevent abuse. If the Contracting
Parties were to decide to permit trade measures of this type
in particular circumstances it would therefore be preferable
for them to do so not by interpreting Article XX, but by
amending or supplementing the provisions of the General
Agreement or waiving obligations thereunder. Such an
approach would enable the Contracting Parties to impose
such limits and develop such criteria.
1 7
This statement reveals the Panel's wish to remove itself as far as possible from
undertaking a final resolution of this particular dispute, and of the
process/product controversy in general. Rather than reaching a definitive
answer, beyond the confines of the current GATT system, the Panel left such
a determination up to the GATT's Contracting Parties.
Some view this "hands-off" approach as an abdication of
duty. [T]he Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report failed to consider
the environmental interests served by the MMPA. For this
reason, the Panel's analysis obscures, rather than illuminates,
the relative weight of the conflicting values at stake in the
tuna/dolphin dispute. Analysis of future conflicts between
the interests in liberalized trade and in protecting the global
commons will need to take account of all relevant
international interests.
138
The merits of such claims notwithstanding, the Panel's conduct
appears consistent with the general practice of GATT dispute resolution
137. Tuna/Dolphin Report, supra note 2, 30 I.L.M. at 1622, 6.3.
138. Dunoff, Reconciling International Trade With Preservation of the Global Common: Can We
Prosper And Protect?, 49 WASH & LEE L. REV 1407, 1428 (1992).
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panels. These panels are generally reluctant to extend GATT law, through
interpretation, to new circumstances such as the MMPA's imposition of
process based trade measures. This sort of action is traditionally left to the
GATT's legislative process.139 A conservative institutional framework of this
nature necessarily removes the possibility for any dispute resolution panel to
find process based trade measures compatible with the current GATT
regime. 4'
Before analyzing the Panel's proposals for change, one should beware
of haphazard alterations to the GATT system in an attempt to make it more
"green."
If the greening of the GATT means that the Contracting
Parties should respect environmental objectives in
administering Article XX, then greening is a good idea. But
if greening means that the Contracting Parties should
subordinate economic goals to ecological imperatives then
greening is a bad idea - for the environment and for the
GATT. It is a bad idea for the environment because the
GATT does not have the scientific expertise to judge what
ecological measures are appropriate. It is a bad idea for the
GATT because environmental policy would be too divisive
for GATT's current decision-making structure. 4'
A. The Problems With Interpretation and General Environmental Amendment.
In its concluding remarks, the Panel recommended against
interpretation, and suggested amendment or waiver of GATT obligations as
possible solutions for the process/product controversy. It is only a strategy
involving the waiver of GATT obligations that will satisfactorily resolve the
growing tensions between international trade and the environment.
1. Interpretation
The Panel recommended against interpretation of Article XX as the
method to address environmental concerns within the GATT framework.
This is true of interpretation intended to divine the intent of the drafters as
well as that undertaken to fit the environment into the language of the GATT
139. OTA Report, supra note 77, at 51.
140. Id.
141. Charnovitz, Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATTArticle XX, 25 JOuRNAL OF
WORLD TRADE 37, 55 (1991)
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as it exists today. For the most part, the Panel backed up this position with
a consistent and narrow analysis of the GATT provisions themselves.
Despite its own warnings, however, the Panel did undertake an
interpretive tact in order to solve the question surrounding the extraterritorial
application of Article XX(b).4.2 Ironically, this inconsistency serves to
strengthen the Panel's overall recommendation against interpretive solutions
to the conflict between trade and the environment.
It has been stated that:
[t]he drafting history cited by the Panel hardly compels-or
even favors- the Panel's conclusion. To the contrary,
although the drafting history indicates that the parties were
concerned, inter alia, with sanitary provisions protecting
their own citizens, no evidence exists in the negotiations the
Panel relies upon that even hints that nations are limited to
protecting animal or plant life within its borders ... This
drafting history simply does not support the conclusion that
the drafters of Article XX(b) intended to disable nations
from protecting global commons resources through the use
of green trade barriers."'
The Panel's interpretation of Article XX(b), prohibiting
extraterritorial application, has been characterized as understandable if one
looks narrowly at the drafting of Article XX(b) between 1946 and 1948.141
The suggestion is that such an analysis ignores the historical background that
served to formulate Article XX(b). This history comes in the form of the
International Convention for the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions
and Restrictions of 1927. Although the goal of the convention was to abolish
all import and export restrictions, eight types of restrictions were permitted
to remain in use. These "exceptions" were considered to have risen to the
level of customary international law and to be based on fundamental notions
of international trade. One such exception allowed "for the protection of
public health or for the protection of animals or plants against disease, insects
and harmful parasites". In fact, an addendum was added to clarify that "the
protection of animals and plants against disease also refers to measures taken
to preserve them from degeneration or extinction." 145 Therefore, under this
142. See infra "Extraterritorial Application of Article XX(b)", at 19.
143. Dunoff, supra note 138, at 1416-1417.
144. Charnovitz, supra note 141, at 44.
145. Id. at 41-42 (Citing League Doc. C.E.1.22 at 21, 97 L.N.T.S. 405, and 97 L.N.T.S. 427).
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interpretation, the U.S., who iacf-authored the language adopted, believed that
Article XX(b) would support existing U.S. trade and environmental laws. '46
This historical analysis and interpretation is consistent with the
jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice and of U.S. courts. 47
Others, however, find such an interpretive analysis of Article XX, and the
GATT in general, as problematic. They contend that this approach ignores
the fact that under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties148
legislative history or "travaux paratoires" is considered a secondary method for
treaty interpretation."4
Uneasiness also exists with respect to stretching the GATT text to
somehow address or encompass environmental issues. In fact, the Panel's
ruling serves to remove this sort of interpretation as a viable candidate for
greening the GATT."'
[A]ttempting to interpret the GATT Articles in such a way
as to create... rules by some further development of GATT
jurisprudence merely seeks to match up two important topic
areas where one has an established set of rules and the other
has few.
51
Although many interpretive solutions may be proposed, none could
satisfactorily resolve the process/product controversy or any other
environmental and trade conflict. After the Panel's decision, and with respect
to Article XX(b), the word "necessary" permits environmentally based trade
sanctions only in very limited circumstances. As previously discussed,1'5 in
order to meet the Panel's threshold of "necessity", environmentally based trade
measures must represent the least trade restrictive means through which the
overriding environmental goal can be achieved. Interpretation of Article
146. Id. at 44-45.
147. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES §325,
comment (e) and (g), reporter's note 4 (1986).
148. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.39/27 art. 31 and 32.
149. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Polices: Congruence or Conflict?, supra note
57, at 1241-1242.
150. Manard, supra note 131, at 424.
151. Id. at 418.
152. See infra "International Agreement", at 25.
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XX(b) could be altered so that "protect" corresponds to the goals of the
contested legislation, and "necessary" to the method of regulation. For
example, protection of endangered species would justify the most trade
restrictive measures. On the other hand, trade measures designed to protect
species to which no immediate threat is perceived would be justified only with
the least trade restrictive measures available. Therefore, under this interpretive
technique, categorization of the goal would determine the degree to which
trade sanctions could restrict trade.153
The difficulties inherent in such a system abound. With respect to
the Tuna/Dolphin controversy, where would dolphin be categorized? In
addition, at what level of danger would process based regulations be deemed
permissible? This or any similar interpretive solution would simply generate
debate and controversy in these procedural areas while the environmental
object of the regulation continued to be harmed.
2. General Environmental Amendment
It has been suggested that the public policy objectives inherent in
Article XX(b) and XX(g) encompass objectives of environmental
protection.154 According to this view, a general environmental amendment
would be entirely consistent with the objectives of Article XX. This sort of
amendment, however, will not satisfactorily resolve the process/product
controversy or other environmental issues. The problem with a general
environmental amendment is reflected in the Panel's concern over imposition
of unilateral extrajurisdictional trade restrictions."' 5  Contracting Party
approval of a general exception for the environment would only change the
GATT cosmetically. One can readily foresee a situation where political
pressure would persuade a Contracting Party to accept such an
environmentally friendly provision. The problem, however, is that such a
general environmental exception would permit each Contracting Party to
retain its own interpretation of the exception's parameters. Therefore, it
would be difficult, if not impossible, to enlarge the scope of Article XX
153. This interpretive model was formulated as part of a group drafting assignment concluded
in conjunction with a Seminar on Environment and Trade at the Georgetown University Law
Center (April, 1993). The author, a member of the group, has included this portion of the
drafting assignment with the permission of the other group members.
154. European Community Proposal on Trade and Environment, Inside U.S. Trade - Special
Report, at S-4 (Nov. 27, 1992).
155. Id. See also infra "Extraterritoriality", at 19.
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without also facilitating the implementation of protectionist barriers justified
on environmental grounds.'56
In addition, the call for a general environmental amendment to the
GATT encounters technical or practical problems.17  An amendment to
Article XX to incorporate the environment would require a two-thirds
acceptance by all of the Contracting Parties. However, the amendment would
only be binding on those Contracting Parties that have accepted the
amendment. Related impracticalities of the amendment process include: (1)
the time consuming process involved in gathering the requisite number of
acceptances, and (2) the ability of developing countries to obtain negotiating
power and therefore successfully challenge an amendment. It was precisely for
these reasons that the Tokyo Round resulted in the adoption of so-called side
codes which in and of themselves represent complex agreements.'58
Unfortunately, the greatest number of acceptances of a Tokyo Round side
code has been thirty-seven. This does not amount to even one-half of total
GATT membership 5 9 Consequently, overcoming these obstacles and
obtaining the requisite two-thirds vote for a general environmental amendment
appear impossible. This systemic rigidity and corresponding inability to
accommodate new aspects of international trade, such as the environment, has
resulted in the gradual disuse of the amendment procedure. 6 '
B. Waiver and Trumping/The Possibilities for International Agreement
It is in the context of the Panel's proposals for amendment that its
suggestion for international agreement must be analyzed. To be truly effective,
an international agreement permitting process based trade measures must
undergo a two-stage evolution. Initially, the agreement itself must be
156. OTA Report, supra note 77, at 51.
157. Amendment to the GATT is governed by Article XXX which reads, in part:
Except where provisions for modification are made elsewhere in this
Agreement, amendments to the provisions of Part I of this Agreement or to
the provisions of Article XXIX or of this Article shall become effective
upon acceptance by all the contracting parties, and other amendments to this
Agreement shall become effective, in respect of those contracting parties
which accept them, upon acceptance by two-thirds of the contracting parties
and thereafter for each other contracting party upon acceptance by it.
GATT, supra note 1, art. XXX, 1, 61 Stat. at A74, 55 U.N.T.S. at 282.
158. Jackson, RESMUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 24-25.
159. Id. at 26.
160. Id. at 4546.
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formulated. At this point, the agreement simply represents a convention, and
is therefore technically without binding force. It is precisely for this reason
that the GATT system must be retained. The second evolutionary phase
involves bringing the international agreement within the general framework
of the GATT. This phase assures that binding rules governing process based
standards can be implemented and enforced.
The call for an international agreement to resolve the controversy
surrounding attempts at process regulation is by no means a novel concept.
Historically, process based trade regulations have been imposed through
international agreement.161  A 1906 convention was adopted to stop
production and importation of matches produced with white phosphorus. The
import ban was imposed not because the matches themselves were harmful,
but because the process by which they were made constituted a health danger
to domestic and foreign workers. In 1911, a treaty was signed between the
U.S., Great Britain, Russia, and Japan outlawing water hunting of seals and sea
otters. This hunting technique left many seals injured and disproportionately
endangered females. The treaty, much like the provisions of the MMPA, also
outlawed the importation of seal skins taken in violation of the convention.
Finally, a 1921 regional agreement between Italy and the Kingdom of the
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes prohibited trade in fish caught by procedures that
had deleterious effects on the spawning and preservation of fisheries. '62
From these historical examples, it is clear that an international agreement
solves, without controversy, the definitional and extrajurisdictional problems
associated with the process/product distinction.
Interestingly, the U.S. seems to have accepted the Panel's call for
international agreement as evidenced by the initiation of negotiations with
Mexico to resolve the Tuna/Dolphin problem. In fact, Mexico has even
requested that the GATT Council postpone consideration of the Panel's report
in lieu of these negotiations.'63 Perhaps this new position was inspired by
161. See Charnovitz, supra note 141, at 39-40.
162. Id.
163. Mexico Agrees to Defer Action on Complaint on U.S. Tuna Embargo, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
SNews Highlights: GATT, at 1351 (Sept. 18, 1991). However, in January of 1992 and under
court order, the U.S. was forced to impose the MMPA's secondary embargo provisions banning
the import of yellowfin tuna and yellowfin tuna products from intermediary nations. See Earth
Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 785 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Cal. 1992). This has resulted in political
pressure being placed on the GATT Council to adopt the Tuna/Dolphin Report and therefore
its finding that the MMPA's intermediary ban is GATT illegal. See, Tuna/Dolphin Report, supra
note 2, 30 I.L.M. at 1621-1622, 5.35-5.40. Any intermediary nation can complain to the GATT
as a result of having been affected by the intermediary ban. To this end, both France and Italy
filed a formal complaint to invoke GATT dispute resolution procedures by requesting
consultations with the U.S. OTA Report, supra note 77, at 15. See also GATT Council Rejuses
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the text of the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA").'"
Article 906, entitled Compatibility and Equivalence, reads:
1. Recognizing the crucial role of standards-related measure
in achieving legitimate objectives, the Parties shall, in
accordance with this Chapter, work jointly to enhance the
level of safety and of protection of human, animal and plant
life and health, the environment and consumers.
2. Without reducing the level of safety or of protection of
human, animal or plant life or health, the environment of
consumers, without prejudice to the rights of any Party
under this Chapter, and taking into account international
standardization activities, the parties shall, to the greatest
extent practicable, make compatible their respective
standards-related measures, so as to facilitate trade in a good
or service between the Parties."'
Furthermore, the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate recently
passed a bill entitled the International Dolphin Conservation Act of 1992.166
This bill represents a regional agreement whereby the embargo on yellowfin
tuna and yellowfin tuna products from Mexico (and Venezuela) would be
removed if those countries agreed to take steps to decrease the incidence of
dolphin takings. Specifically, the bill would amend the MMPA to allow the
U.S. Secretary of State to enter into agreements establishing a five year
moratorium on the use of purse-seine nets on dolphins. Any such agreements
EC Request to Adopt Panel Report on U.S. Tuna Embargo, INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) §General
Developments: GATT, at 352 (Feb. 26, 1992). This process lead to the GATT selection of a
dispute resolution panel. Panelists Being Selected for Second GA7T Panel on Tuna, INT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA) §Import Policy: European Community, at 1552-1553 (Sept. 2, 1992). The dispute
resolution panel recently found the MMPA's intermediary ban to be inconsistent with US
obligations under the GATT. The new fear in the U.S. is that this ruling will adversely affect the
chances for Congressional ratification of the Uruguay Round. Kantor Says United States WdlAsk
for Full Review in Tuna/Dolphin Ruling, INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) §General Developments:
GATT, at 814 (May 25, 1994).
164. North American Free Trade Agreement Between The Governments Of The United States
Of America, The Government Of Canada, And The Government Of The United Mexican States
(1992) [hereinafter NAFTA].
165. Id. at Part Three, Technical Barriers To Trade, Chapter Nine, Standards-Related Measures art.
906.
166. H.R. Res. 5419, 102d. Cong., 2d Sess., 138 Cong. Rec. H 9365, vol. 138, no. 132,
International Dolphin Conservation Act of 1992 (Sept. 24, 1992).
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were to take effect on March 1, 1994.167 Although these talks are being
conducted on a regional level, this bill seems to represent the sort of action the
Panel was striving for. It is through these regional activities that GATT
compatible process/product standards may be achieved. These standards can
then be applied to multilateral agreements and eventually incorporated into the
GATT system itself.
1. Formulating an International Agreement.
Proposed guidelines regarding the form such an international
environmental agreement should take have come from the European Union
("EU"). The influence of the Panel's ruling is clear.
A Specific exemption under Article XX is only justified
when the environmental agreement is genuinely multilateral
in nature. In order to arrive at such a definition, certain
criteria could be examined:
(i) The agreement should have been negotiated under the
aegis of the United Nations or a specialized agency such as
UNEP or the procedures for negotiation should have been
open for participation of all GATT members
(ii) The agreement should be open for accession by any
GATT members on terms which are equitable in relation to
those which apply to original members.
(iii) Certain environmental problems are regional in nature
and therefore may need to be addressed at the regional level.
In such cases, the criteria suggested above should apply to all
countries within the region. ... Quite clearly, such regional
agreement cannot provide any justification for applying
extrajurisdictional trade measures vis-a-vis countries outside
the region."8
The implication is that international standards or customary
international law addressing process/product issues would make it easier to
167. Id. See also Bill That Would End Tuna Embargoes Under MMPA To Be Sent To President,
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) SImport Policy: Trade Policy, at 1760 (Oct. 14, 1992); Ways and Means
Approves Measures on NAFTA Standards and Tuna Embargo, INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) SGeneral
Developments: NAFTA, at 1342 (Aug. 5, 1992).
168. European Community Proposal on Trade and Environment, supra note 154, at S-5.
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resolve trade and environmental disputes and consequently decrease the
likelihood of conflict. Achieving international consensus, however, requires
more than simple GATT involvement in the process. This level of negotiation
will require that all countries, developed and developing, all governmental and
non-governmental trade and environmental agencies, and the United Nations
be involved. 69
It is much easier to state that an international agreement addressing
the process/product controversy should be created and agree on its general
form than it is to actually arrive at one. Several problems are associated with
this sort of negotiation. Reaching an agreement is often a slow and arduous
process requiring flexibility and a willingness to compromise.'70 The cause
of these extended negotiations can be linked to the number of parties that
must be involved as well as to economic and diplomatic concerns.
1 7 1
Unfortunately, this time factor may allow irreversible environmental harm,
such as loss of species, to occur before the agreements are concluded.'72
In addition, even if successful negotiation is accomplished, a country
may be reluctant to join such an agreement for various reasons. It may: (1)
disbelieve scientific evidence and simply declare that a particular environmental
problem does not exist, (2) acknowledge the existence of such a problem, but
assign it low priority for resolution, (3) disagree with the proposed agreement's
allocation of responsibility for resolving the problem, or (4) simply try to
"free-ride" and benefit from the efforts of others. 73 Finally, there is also the
requirement of enforcement, and therefore verification. A sound system of
verification is needed to instill confidence in the agreement, encouraging
uncommitted countries to join.'74 It is precisely for the foregoing reasons
that the IATTC has struggled to achieve the goals of its dolphin conservation
program. In fact, it was only in 1986 that all ETP purse-seine fishing nations
took part in this program.'75
169. OTA Report, supra note 77, at 73.
170. David J. Ross, Note, Making GA7TDolphin.Saf" Trade and the Environment, 2 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 345, 357-358 (1992).
171. Christensen, supra note 12, at 594.
172. Housman and Zaelke, supra note 6, at 10277.
173. GATT Secretariat, supra note 76, at 29.
174. Cairncross, Whose World is it, Anyway?, THE ECONOMIST, §Survey; The Environment, at
6 (May 30, 1992).
175. Christensen, supra note 12, at 594-595.
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Prioritizing environmental issues to be addressed by these agreements
is not the answer. Essentially, prioritizing simply corresponds to an
international agreement to agree on the order in which these matters will be
negotiated and eventually resolved. Creating a list of priorities will encounter
the same obstacles as negotiation of the agreements themselves. The best
approach is simply to allow any country to initiate an agreement on any
particular subject. The merits of the cause, and therefore the degree of
international consensus, will determine the success of the negotiation.
Finally, it is difficult to imagine that countries with strong
environmental policies, such as the U.S. with the MMPA, will be persuaded
to be flexible and conciliatory if it means they will have to reduce their
environmental standards. The potential for hostile reactions seems inevitable.
In fact, a concurrent resolution in the U.S. Congress reflects this antagonism.
The resolution reads, in part:
Whereas the GATT panel ruling additionally declared that
nations may not have laws that protect health, safety, or the
environment beyond that nation's geographic borders, or
laws that take into account the process or conditions under
which a product is produced or harvested;
Whereas the GATT panel ruling may also jeopardize other
United States laws and international agreements intended to
protect global resources, including provisions that protect the
stratospheric ozone layer, provisions to save endangered
species, provisions to discourage driftnet fishing, and
provisions for the protection of whales; and ...
Now, therefore, be it resolved by the House of
Representatives (The Senate Concurring)
Section 1. President.
The Congress calls upon the President to initiate and
complete negotiations, as part of the current Uruguay Round
GATT talk, to make the GATT compatible with the Marine
Mammal Protection Act and other United States health,
safety, labor, and environmental laws, including those laws
that are designed to protect the environment outside the
geographic borders of the United States.
Section 2. Legislation.
The Congress will not approve legislation to implement any
trade agreement (including the Uruguay Round of the GATT
and the United States-Mexico Free Trade Agreement) if such
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agreement jeopardizes United States health, safety, labor, or
environmental laws.176
The benefits provided by international environmental agreements, however,
outweigh their associated difficulties. The process of multilateral negotiation
allows all countries to express their desires and concerns through negotiation.
The net result of such a process is an agreement that incorporates these factors
in its standards. This necessarily enhances adherence to and the enforceability
of the agreement.lfl
2. The Waiver and Trumping Solution.
Creating an international agreement that provides for process based
trade measures is only the first stage in addressing the process/product debate
or any other environmental issue. Assuming that the difficulties associated
with the negotiation of such an agreement can be resolved, and this constitutes
a very large presumption, the question becomes how it will be implemented
and what will its relationship be to the GATT? Waiver of GATT obligations
and the subsequent creation of a trumping system represents the best way to
implement such an agreement while keeping it within the auspices of the
international trading system. In fact, GATT incorporation of international
environmental agreements that have trade sanctions as part of their
enforcement mechanisms has been characterized as an ultimate necessity.1
78
The combination of the Panel's findings and international consensus indicates
that this is the only way that those trade measures will be deemed GATT
consistent.
The waiver and trumping solution constitutes a two stage process.
Initially, GATT obligations would be waived with respect to a particular
international environmental agreement. This will serve to bring the agreement
within the GATT system in a relatively short period of time. During the
period for which the waiver is viable, the agreement itself would be added to
a list of similar multilateral conventions contained in a general trumping
provision amended to the GATT. It is in this way that process based trade
measures could be incorporated into the GATT system.
176. H.R. Con. Res. 246, 102d. Cong., 2d Sess., 138 Cong. Rec. H 7698, H 7699, vol. 138, no.
115, Relation of Trade Agreements to Health, Safety, Labor and Environmental Laws (Aug. 6,
1992).
177. Matthew Hunter Hurlock, Note, The GA7T, U.S. Law and the Environment: A Proposal to
Amend the GATT in Light of the Tuna/Dolphin Decision, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2143 (1992).
178. GeneralAgreement on Tarffs and Trade Will Incltde Environmen4 EPA's Reilly Says, INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) §General Developments: GATT, at 1829 (Oct. 21, 1992).
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Compared with formal amendment, waiver of GATT obligations
entails less stringent procedural requirements. 9 In addition, such a waiver:
would ensure that the proposed trade policy actions would
be focused on the environmental problems in question, and
that they would be transparent, multilaterally negotiated,
have broad support among the GATT membership, and be
subject to conditions designed to avoid abuse.180
Waiver of GATT obligations will allow international agreements dealing with
the process/product distinction to prevail over GATT rules. Thus, trade
measures taken pursuant to those regimes would not be deemed inconsistent
with the GATT. 8' As a result, individual Contracting Parties could impose
import restrictions on exports from countries with what those agreements
define to be inadequate environmental regulations.11
2
Waivers of GATT obligations, however, are granted for only limited
periods of time, in exceptional circumstances, and are not considered a
substitute for rule revision."' To address these issues, a trumping
mechanism must be amended to the GATT. A system of this nature has been
adopted in the text of the NAFTA. Article 104, entitled Relation to
Environmental and Conservation Agreements, reads:
I. In the event of any inconsistency between this Agreement
and the specific trade obligations set out in:
179. Article XXV addresses the issue of waiving GATT obligations. This article reads, in part:
In exceptional circumstances not elsewhere provided for in this Agreement,
the Contracting Parties may waive an obligation imposed upon a contracting
party by this Agreement; Provided that any such decision shall be approved
by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast and that such majority shall
comprise more than half of the contracting parties.
GATT, supra note 1, art. XXV, 5, 61 Stat. at A68, 55 U.N.T.S. at 272.
180. GATT Secretariat, supra note 76, at 12.
181. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Polices: Congruence or Conflict?, supra note
57 at 1244-1245.




(a) the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, done at
Washington, March 3, 1973, as amended June 22,
1979;
(b) the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer, done at Montreal, September 16, 1987,
as amended June 29, 1990;
(c) the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundry
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal,
done at Basel March 22, 1989, on its entry into force
for Canada, Mexico and the United States; or
(d) the agreements set out in Annex 104.1,
such obligations shall prevail to the extent of the
inconsistency, provided that where a Party has a choice
among equally effective and reasonably available means of
complying with such obligations, the Party chooses the
alternative that is the least inconsistent with the other
provisions of this Agreement.
2. The Parties may agree in writing to modify Annex 104.1
to include any amendment to an agreement referred to in
paragraph 1, and any other environmental or conservation
agreement.
18 4
Such a system serves simultaneously to permit and constrain the use
of trade measures adopted in the name of the environment."8 5 Unlike a
general environmental amendment, a trumping system would provide the
Contracting Parties with a precise indication of permissible environmentally
based trade sanctions.
Inclusion of such a provision, however, would involve the amendment
process and its associated difficulties. 1 6 Ironically, the drafting history of the
GATT indicates that a similar trumping clause was present in Article 45 of the
Havana Charter, the document designed to create the structure of the ill-fated
184. NAFTA, supra note 164, Part One, General Part, Chapter One, Relation to Environmental
and Conservation Agreements, art. 104.
185. Dunoff, supra note 138, at 1441.
186. See, infra "General Environmental Amendment", at p. 37.
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ITO. This precursor to GATT Article XX contained an additional exception
that covered measures "taken in pursuance of any intergovernmental agreement
which relates solely to the conservation of fisheries resources, migratory birds
or wild animals." 
187
When there has been formulation of criteria through which new
agreements could be added to the general trumping provision, the waiver
portion of the "waiver and trumping solution" can be abandoned. At that
time an automatic trumping mechanism could be installed. Under such a
system, an international environmental agreement intended to be added to the
general trumping provision, and signed by the requisite number of Contracting
Parties, would automatically prevail over inconsistent GATT obligations.
Once an agreement with international environmental standards is in
place, trade measures can be implemented to address process based concerns.
In this context, measures are deemed effective because:
[t]hey can help convince a country to join an international
environmental agreement or to behave according to certain
environmental norms; deny a country economic gain from
failing to follow such norms; prevent a country's actions
from undermining the environmental effectiveness of other
countries' efforts; and remove the economic incentive for
certain environmentally undesirable economic activity. 88
Interestingly, the same reasons have been advanced to justify strictly
unilateral action as envisioned by the U.S. under the MMPA. The argument
is that much like trade sanctions taken pursuant to international agreement,
unilateral action can serve as a catalyst to bring about either the international
agreement in the first place, or compliance with and accession to its terms.8 9
As suggested by the GATT Council, trade measures taken under the
umbrella of an international agreement "will not, in general, pose practical
difficulties under the GATT as long as they reflect the necessary degree of
multilateral consensus." 1  Furthermore, international agreement and
subsequent GATT waiver and trumping solves the Panel's concern over
unilateral extrajurisdictional protection since that concept is rendered moot
187. The Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Analytical Index,
GATT/LEG/2, Article XX-1 (Geneva, 1989); See also GATTery v Greenery; The Perils of
Eco-Sanctions, supra note 4, at 15.
188. OTA Report, supra note 77, at 42.
189. Housman and Zaelke, supra note 6, at 10276.
190. Id. at 23.
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where the international community has agreed to act on an environmental
problem. According to the EU, this system of waiver and trumping solves
GATT's inherent problem of a per se lack of environmental competence.191
The waiver and trumping solution serves to define the role of the
international trade system with respect to the process/product distinction as
well as to the environment in general. "[T]he GATT should limit itself to
clarifying the scope for using trade measures within the framework of an
[international agreement] rather than defining the type of environmental
problem which may require the use of trade measures." 2 Formation of these
international agreements outside the confines of the GATT system assures that
environmental experts are responsible for their negotiation. Their subsequent
incorporation into the GATT through waiver or a trumping provision permits
the traditional GATT system to operate as it does best; by analyzing the
merits of environmentally motivated non-tariff barriers to trade. Adoption of
such a deferential approach has been descried as "the best thing the GATT can
do for the cause of a more sustainable environment."
193
As with any proposal, there are problems associated with such a
waiver and trumping solution. For example, situations will arise where trade
measures are taken pursuant to one of the waived or trumped agreements but
with respect to a non-signatory, or to a signatory that has taken a reservation
to a portion of that agreement. The Panel's ruling has been criticized for not
elaborating on the interplay between the international agreement and the
GATT and for its failure to suggest on the number of signatories required for
an agreement to trump the GATT for all of the Contracting Parties. 94 It
is precisely these issues that have been undertaken by the recently activated
GATT Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade.19
One suggestion for resolving this dilemma is to only allow trade
measures against non-signatories if taken pursuant to multilateral agreement
adopted by a designated quorum of countries. In addition, this system would
provide a right of appeal for those countries discriminated against.19' The
EU has suggested that a "collective interpretation" of Article XX represents
the best way to clarify the extent to which such measures can derogate from
191. European Community Proposal on Trade and Environment, supra note 154, at S-4.
192. Id. at S-3.
193. Charnovitz, supra note 141, at 55.
194. Housman and Zaelke, supra note 6, at 10277.
195. GATT Secretariat, supra note 76, at 10.
196. The Greening ofProtectionism, supra note 5, at 28.
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the obligations contained in the rest of the GATT. 7  This indicates that
application of these agreements to non-signatories is more acceptable than
unilateral extrajurisdictional application of one nation's laws as in the case of
the MMPA and Mexico. In this way, the same reasoning put forward for the
imposition of trade measures pursuant to an international agreement dealing
with the process/product distinction could be used to formulate a jurisdictional
rule of reason to justify the application of trade sanctions taken pursuant to
an international agreement against a non-member.
An environmentally oriented multilateral round of trade negotiations
represents the evolutionary culmination in the process of greening the GATT.
In fact, there already exist aspirations and proposals for the next GATT round
to be the "Green Round.""' Such a "Green Round" may lead to the
creation of an environmental equivalent to the Final Act's General Agreement
on Trade in Services ("GATS")t99 and Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods
("TRIPS")."0  This would also resolve the fear that waiver or trumping
simply reflect an underlying sentiment that environmental rules are somehow
subservient to those of international trade.201 This level of negotiation could
set out in a systematic fashion the obligations of all GATT signatories, while
keeping the substantive environmental issues separate from the traditional
GATT system and consistent with the multilateral agreements created up to
this point.22  Furthermore, if the idea of a WTO is approved, this will
197. European Community Proposal on Trade and Environment, supra note 154, at S-4.
198. Baucus Urges New GA7T "Green" Round to consider Proposed Environmental Code, INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) SGeneral Developments: GATT, at 1829 (Nov. 6, 1991).
199. Final Act, supra note 80, Part II, Annex 1-B, General Agreement on Trade in Services
[hereinafter GATS].
200. Id., Part II, Annex 1-C, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods [hereinafter TRIPS].
201. See Housman and Zaelke, Trade Environment, and Sustainable Devdopment: A Primer, 15
HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 535, 553 (1992).
202. The notion of being part of the GATT framework while at the same time being a relatively
autonomous body seems to be addressed in the text of the GATS. Article XXIV entitled Council
for Trade in Services reads, in part:
1. The Council for Trade in Services shall carry out such functions as may
be assigned to it to facilitate the operation of this Agreement and further its
objectives. The Council may establish such subsidiary bodies as it considers
appropriate for the effective discharge of its functions.
2. The Council and, unless the Council decides otherwise, its subsidiary
bodies shall be open to participation by representatives of Members.
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create a common institutional framework for the GATT as modified by the
Uruguay round as well as all of the arrangements concluded under its auspices.
In order to join the WTO, a country would be required to accept all of these
agreements as well as the traditional GATT obligations.2°  Therefore, a
successful Green round would pave the way for an Environmental Council
within the WTO (along with a Goods Council, Services Council and
Intellectual Property Council). This Environmental Council would be
autonomous enough to objectively balance environmental and trade
objectives.2"4
Final Act, supra note 80, Part II, Annex I-B, General Agreement on Trade in Services, Part V,
Institutional Provisions, Councilfor Trade in Services, art. XXIV. A similar provision is contained
in the text of the TRIPS. The article entitled Council on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, reads, in part:
The Council on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights shall
monitor the operation of this Agreement and, in particular, Members'
compliance with their obligations thereunder, and shall afford Members the
opportunity of consulting on matters relating to the trade-related aspects of
intellectual property rights. It shall carry out such other responsibilities as
assigned to it by the Members, and it shall, in particular, provide any
assistance requested by them in the context of dispute settlement procedures.
In carrying out its functions, the Council may consult with and seek
information from any source it deems appropriate.
Final Act, supra note 80, Part II, Annex 1-C, Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Including Counterfeit Goods, Part VII, Institutional Arrangements; Final Provision,
art. 68.
203. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, supra note 136, at 636.
204. The groundwork for an Environmental Council is laid out in the so-called "Decision on
Trade and the Environment". This will establish a standing trade and environment committee that
will function within the WTO. The committee's objective will be to study the link between trade
and environmental protection. Initially, the committee is to address the following issues:
1. the relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system
and trade measures for environmental purposes, including those pursuant to
multilateral environmental agreements;
2. the relationship between environmental policies relevant to trade and
environmental measures with significant trade effects and the provisions of
the multilateral trading system;
3. the relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system
and taxes for environmental purposes and requirements for environmental
purposes relating to products, including standards and technical regulations,
packaging, labeling, and recycling;
4. the provisions of the multilateral trading system with respect to
transparency of trade measures used for environmental purposes, and
environmental measures and requirements that have significant trade effects;
5. the relationship between the dispute settlement mechanisms in the
multilateral trading system and those found in multilateral environmental
agreements;
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Unlike suggestions for a case-by-case balancing analysis,"' the
waiver and trumping solution reinforces a rule based GATT system and leaves
both environmentalists and "free traders" sure of the playing field. In this
way, a GATT type of arrangement within the WTO can become reality.
Although this is clearly an arduous task, it appears to be the only satisfactory
long term solution to peacefully reconcile the process/product controversy and
the overall clash between international trade and the environment.
IV. CONCLUSION
As evidenced by the Panel's resolution of the Tuna/Dolphin dispute,
the current GATT system will not tolerate unilaterally imposed process based
trade measures that have extraterritorial implications. This controversy reflects
only one of the problems faced by those wishing to reconcile the clash
between the regimes of international trade on one side, and the environment
on the other. The process/product impasse serves as a excellent model on
which all of the problems associated with this clash of cultures can be
resolved. It is evident that the GATT system works and that it is here to stay.
It is also clear that the current GATT system is not suited to address
substantive issues relating to environmental protection. To redress this
deficiency, the GATT should be changed in such a way as to accommodate
process regulation and other environmental concerns. The best way to initiate
this process is through the Panel's suggestion for the waiver of GATT
obligations with respect to international environmental agreements. In this
way, the efficient and successful GATT trading framework is left intact while
international agreements are incorporated to address environmentally related
issues. The ultimate hope is that this process will lead to the creation of a
single, comprehensive, and substantive framework for both international trade
and the environment. If these changes are ultimately achieved, the
6. the effect of environmental measures on market access, especially in
relation to developing countries, in particular to the least developed among
them, and environmental benefits of removing trade restrictions and
distortions; and
7. the issue of exports of domestically prohibited goods.
It is certainly no coincidence that the committee's proposed agenda mirrors many of the issues
raised in the Tuna/Dolphin Report. The overriding apprehension for complete integration of the
environment and the international trading system remains the use of trade-related measures and
unilateral sanctions designed to promote environmental change in another country. Accord Set
Among GATT Nations on Linking Trade, Environment, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) §General
Developments: GATT, at 565 (April 13, 1994). The basis for concern seems to come from
developing countries who view the environment (as well as labor issues) as a way to disguise
protectionism. Sutherland Says He is Not Candidate for Head of World Trade Organization, INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) §General Developments: GATT, at 649 (April 27, 1994).
205. See, Dunoff, supra note 138.
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Tuna/Dolphin Report may go down in history as an environmentally friendly
decision after all.

